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Abstract
In many developing countries, the majority of physicians em-
ployed in government clinics also have a private practice. We
develop a simple model to show that allowing dual practice helps
low-income governments retain skilled physicians to assure pa-
tient access. If dual-practice providers di¤erentially refer higher-
incomepatients to private practice, public funding becomes more
e¤ectively targeted on the poor. Yet dual practice physicians
may also skimp on e¤ort, pilfer supplies, and induce demand.
Patterns of care-seeking in Indonesia, especially disproportionate
useofprivateproviders by theurban poor, areconsistent withex-
acerbated incentive for physician self-referral to private practice
in urban areas.
JEL Classi…cation: I1, J3, O1
Keywords: dual job holding; physician compensation; public-
private competition; induced demand; Indonesian health care
1 Introduction
In many developing countries, the majority of physicians employed in
government clinics also have a private practice. In the 1993 Indone-
sian Family Life Survey, 80 percent of public-sector physicians reported
having a private practice. In other developing countries as disparate
as India, Egypt, and Vietnam, the prevalence of dual job holding for
physicians is also quite high (Chawla 1996).
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1Multiple job holding is at odds with basic labor supply theories that
predict individuals would prefer to work more hours at their highest-
paying job rather than holding multiple jobs (Lang 1994). It is also
contrary to theories of incentive design that predict that employers will
want toconstrain employeetemptation todivert time and attention from
hard-to-monitor tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; as Holmstrom
1999 notes, “it is standard praxis that ordinary employees cannot work
for two …rms at the same time” [p.94]). Potential for severe con‡icts
of interest, and damage to public sector quality, might seem to suggest
that any government should proscribe dual practice, if it were capable
of enforcing such a ban. The prevalence of dual practice in developing
countries thus presents a puzzle. It suggests that both physicians and
governments–implicitly if not explicitly–acknowledge complementarities
between jobs, and that there might be some advantages to allowing dual
practice, particularly for developing countries.
Understanding the incentives of dual practice can also be construc-
tive for analyzing under-the-table, “gratuity” or “informal” payments to
public sector providers, which are widespread in developing and tran-
sitional economies (Lewis 2000; Kornai and Eggleston 2001; McKee,
Healy, and Falkingham 2002). Indeed, when the physician’s “private
practice” consists of using public facilities to treat private-pay patients,
dual practice is synonymous with under-the-table payments.
To understandthe possible advantages ofallowing dual practice, con-
sider a developing country that seeks to guarantee its citizens universal
access to primary health care. Without government …nancing, some
high-income consumers would buy primary care services from available
providers, but many low-income consumers might not. To achieve uni-
versal access, public intervention is needed for the latter group. Public
…nancing targeted to the poor would be ideal. In practice, many coun-
tries adopt a system of implicit coverage through delivery of care at
government hospitals and clinics. Thus access to basic health care, par-
ticularly for the poor, depends upon government ability to attract and
retain competent physicians in public clinics and hospitals.
We argue that a useful way to understand government policies re-
garding dual practice and informal payments is to think of a govern-
ment employer o¤ering a total compensation package to physicians that
includes both salary and the non-wage “bene…t” of private practice rev-
enue. Allowing dual practice enables the government to recruit qual-
ity providers at a modest budgetary expense.1 It is in this sense that
1In Tajikistan, for example, o¢cial physician salaries in 1998 were only US$2.80-
3.50 per month, compared to the workforce average of US$11 (McKee, Healy and
Falkingham 2002: 136). Even in more advanced transitional economies such as Hun-
2dual practice may enhance access. The availability of private practice
represents an uno¢cial but often widely expected perk of government
employment. In most countries where the public and private sectors do
not share physicians, higher private sector wages are expected to attract
higher quality physicians, leaving lower quality physicians in the public
sector (Chawla1996). Disallowing dual practice wouldthus put the pub-
lic sector at a competitive disadvantage for attracting capable doctors,
necessitating either a signi…cant increase of o¢cial salaries (to compen-
satedoctors forthe opportunitycost offoregone private-practice income)
or acceptance that higher-skill, higher-compensated doctors will dispro-
portionately move to the private sector, compromising access for those
unable or unwilling to pay private-sector prices. Since skilled clinicians
expect to be able to generate signi…cant income from private practice,
allowing dual practice may be one of the most e¤ective policies that a
cash-strapped low-income government can use to retain skilled physi-
cians in public clinics and hospitals.
This application of compensating di¤erentials and total compensa-
tion theory (e.g., Pauly 1997, Miller 2003) to dual practice, formalized
below, …nds considerable support in the policy literature. For example,
Gruen et al. (2002) argue that dual practice is viewed as legitimate
in sub-Saharan African primarily to supplement extremely low o¢cial
salaries, and that in Asia, “most governments have a permissive attitude
to joint public/private practice, because they see it as a way to mobilize
further resources and to retain quali…ed sta¤ in the public health sector”
(p.268). As Paxon and Sicherman (1996) argue, public practice may also
enable physicians to balance ‡uctuations in their income streams from
private practice.
Moreover, since public health services are typically available to all
patients “free” or heavily subsidized, they are utilized even by those
who would otherwise have purchased care from private providers. This
“crowds out” private …nancing and creates a deadweight loss to soci-
ety from additional tax distortions to …nance the public facilities. If
dual-practice providers di¤erentially refer higher-income consumers to
private practice, as would be consistent with income maximization as
well as with altruistic concern for patient welfare, public funding of gov-
ernment health facilities becomes more e¤ectively targeted on poor con-
sumers. Dual practice could therefore serve as an informal means test
for e¢cient sorting of consumers between sectors, while simultaneously
allowing physicians to supplement income through price discrimination.
gary and Poland, physicians earned only 27-33% more than the average employee; by
contrast, physicians in Germany and the United States earn more than 400% more
than the average German or American employee (Kornai and Eggleston 2001: 167).
3These potential bene…ts of dual practice do not come without a cost,
however. Dual practice providers may skimp onwork hours in the public
sector to spend time in private practice. Since monitoring of provider
time and e¤ort is costly, often only minimal presence in a public practice
is required to access the non-pecuniary bene…ts of public employment
(e.g., o¢cial salary and civil servant fringe bene…ts such as public hous-
ing). This skimping may adversely a¤ect access and quality of care for
patients seeking treatment at government facilities.
Dual practice providers may also use government supplies and equip-
ment in treatmentof private sector patients. Such “free riding” on public
…nancing to generate personal pro…t clearly undermines the e¢ciency of
public delivery and typically constitutes regressive income redistribu-
tion. Furthermore, such opportunities give dual practice physicians a
cost advantage over physicians solely in private practice. Free riding on
public facilities can therefore constitute a break on the healthy develop-
ment of a private sector delivery system (Kornai and Eggleston 2001),
and may contribute to higher overall healthcare costs.2
Furthermore, dual practice providers have incentives to induce de-
mandfor privatepracticeservices. Thepropensityofhealthcare providers
to over-refer to facilities in which they have a …nancial interest is widely
recognized (e.g., by laws prohibiting physician ownership of pharmacies
in the US). Such self-referral, of which dual practice self-referral con-
stitutes an important case, exempli…es the controversial phenomenon
of physician-induced demand.3 Since consumers with low educational
levels and in poor health may be especially vulnerable to such induce-
ment, the perverse incentives of dual practice are a particular concern
for policymakers aiming to protect vulnerable populations.
This paper …rst develops a simple model of these dual practice in-
centives. In deciding on the degree of permissiveness for dual practice
and informal payments, the government recognizes the negative e¤ects
of allowing dual practice. Indeed, in our simple model the government
explicitly seeks to maintain a given quality of care while minimizing the
total cost of salaries plus the social costs of dual practice.
We next use data from the 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey to ex-
2The argument is paralleltoone made by critics of physician ownership of ancillary
treatment facilities in the US: opportunities for self-referral may inhibit competition
from facilities that do not bene…t from such self-referral, and thus raise overall costs
(Mitchell and Sass 1995: 264).
3“Adding up the evidence, on obstetricians doing more C-sections, surgeons do-
ing more bypass operations, physicians referring more frequently to their own labs,
and other studies, makes a convincing case that doctors can in‡uence quantity and
sometimes do so for their own purposes” (McGuire 2000: 517, italics added, referring
to Mitchell and Sass 1995).
4amine whether measurable quality and price can explain patient choice
of provider, or whether there is evidence of induced demand, particu-
larly among the most vulnerable. Because we can compare public and
private providers onstructural, procedural, andamenity aspects of qual-
ity and price, we directly address whether the poor are choosing private
providers because their quality is higher. Dual practice will entail so-
cial costs only to the extent that patterns of choice are driven more by
provider incentives than the best interest of the patient. Unfortunately
data limitations and lack of exogenous variation in dual practice condi-
tions preclude a direct test of inducement behavior or the other potential
costs and bene…ts of dual practice. Instead we focus whether the propen-
sity of lower-income patients to use expensive private providers di¤ers
across areas where providers face di¤erent competitionfor patients, such
as in urban versus rural areas.
The detailed analysis of consumer behavior undertaken here o¤ers
four main advantages over previous work. First, many studies cannot
measure public and private sector quality accurately because physicians
who practice in the public sector di¤er from those who practice in the
private sector along important dimensions not observed by the analyst.
This confounding from unobservable physician characteristics is far less
of aconcern in Indonesia because of the prevalence of dual practice. Sec-
ond, information on individual facility characteristics allows for quality
measures and ownership type to a¤ect consumer choice of provider in-
dependently. Thus we can separate “ownership e¤ects” from “quality
e¤ects” to see whether “publicness” or “privateness” in‡uence consumer
choice after controlling for measured dimensions of price and quality.
Third, we use a number of dimensions of quality and price to examine
the potential determinants of consumer choice. Finally, in addition to
the standard multinomial logit model used in the literature, we estimate
a nested multinomial logit and a heteroscedastic extreme value model,
while allowing up to eight of the actual providers available in a market
area, each with their speci…c characteristics, to comprise the choice set
facing a consumer. Thus, the empirical part of the study adds to the
literature on determinants of consumer behavior in developing countries
by delving into consumer responsiveness to multiple aspects of quality
of care and ownership in addition to price.4
4Leonard (forthcoming) also examines patient choice of provider in low-income
countries, but focuses on how the choice of traditional healers can be traced to their
ability to use outcome-contingent contracts. Unfortunately we are unable to include
traditional healers (or other providers such as nurses and pharmacists) in the present
study of patient choice because the data on quality is not directly comparable to that
available about physicians.
5In the next section, we develop a simple model to analyze the in-
centives of governments and providers regarding dual practice. We then
overview the Indonesiancontextof primary healthcare delivery and dual
provision. The …nal sections present empirical work estimating Indone-
sian consumer responsiveness to various dimensions of quality and price,
and discuss the implications of our results for policy.
2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Dual Practice
A simple model of compensation package design and compensating dif-
ferentials can well illuminate most of the critical incentive trade-o¤s and
associated policy controversies about dual practice. Consider a govern-
ment seeking to sta¤ a public clinic or hospital. The government chooses
asalary level for public sectorphysicians, S, anda permissiveness of dual
practice, D. Evenif the government chooses tomake dual practiceillegal
(D = 0), physicians may still expect D > 0 if there is lax enforcement
of the rules and/or widespread acceptance of informal patient payments
above the o¢cial public fee (whichwe assume, for simplicity, to be zero).
In a dynamic model, D could represent the discounted expected value
of ability to earn private practice earnings, including the ability to build
a private practice clientele and eventually retire from public service.
Let b(D) represent the money metric of physician bene…ts from pri-
vate practice revenue when dual practice is allowed. These bene…ts are
increasing and concave in the government’s permissiveness toward dual
practice: b0 > 0; b00 < 0, partly due to the trade-o¤ between income from
work and leisure. Some evidence suggests that physician bene…ts from
private practice are substantial.5 Physicians derive utility from salary
and bene…ts, U (S;b(D)), and must receive a reservation utility of U to
work in the public sector.6
Allowing private practice entails certain social costs, c(D) ¸ 0. Ex-
amples include using public resources to treat private patients and di-
5Gruen et al. (2002) surveyed 100 government-employed doctors in Bangladesh
who also had private practices. A majority reported at least to double their govern-
ment income by engaging in private practice. Lerberghe et al. (2002: 583) argue
that “in the average low-income country, salaries would have to be multiplied by at
least a factor of …ve to bring them to the level of incomes from small private prac-
tices.” This magnitude receives independent corroboration from a study of health
service contracting in Cambodia, where o¢cial salary increases of 500-800% did not
fully compensate some public health workers for the loss of income from the ban of
private practice (Soeters and Gri¢ths 2003).
6In a more general model developed below, physicians derive utility from income
Y, leisure L, and perhaps experience disutility from inducement I: U(Y;L;I): Gov-
ernment permissiveness of dual practice impacts all three arguments in the utility
function. For simplicity we …rst posit that U(Y(S;D);L(D);I(D)) takes the form
U(S;b(D)).
6verting even low-income patients from subsidized public care to expen-
sive private treatment. Assume these social costs are increasing in D, at
an increasing rate: c(0) = 0; c0 > 0; c00 > 0.
Assume the government wishes to maximize the net bene…t ofpatient
access to primary care. Bene…t includes quality, proxied by the average
physician skill level µ, and access, proxied by the number of physicians
who accept public employment, N, and the average time physicians de-
vote to public practice, T. Each of these measures of quality is itself a
function of dual practice permissiveness: D a¤ects recruitment, N(D),
the skill level of physicians attracted to public employment, µ(D), and
the time devoted to public practice, T(D).
We will discuss physician heterogeneity and dual practice as a pol-
icy to attract high-µ physicians in the next section. We will also allow
physicians to skimp on public practice duties by choosing T. For now,
however, we simplify by assuming the government achieves a minimum
acceptable level of quality if it can recruit a representative physician.
The goal of maximizing quality less cost thus becomes the objective
of minimizing the costs of providing basic access to care with publicly





s:t:U (S;b(D)) ¸ U:
The …rst-order conditions for constrained minimization imply that
the government sets the salary S¤ to meet the physician participation






= c0 (D): (2)
The left hand side of (2) represents the (negative of the) physicians’
marginal rate of substitution between non-wage perks and salary, mul-
tiplied by the marginal bene…t to doctors of dual practice ‘perks.’ The
right hand side is the marginal social cost, c0 > 0, of dual-practice priv-
ileges. The government balances the bene…t of relaxing the physician
participation constraint (and thus allowing the government to employ
many physicians despite low salary S) against the social costs of dual
practice.
Accordingly, governments would optimally allow dual practice when
the opportunity costs of raising government physician salaries are high
7compared to the social costs of allowing dual practice. The govern-
ment can remove the social costs by prohibiting–and strictly enforcing
prohibition–of dual practice, as in many advanced market economies.
Attracting physicians into public practice would then require o¤ering
public-sector salaries (and other bene…ts) su¢cient to compensate for
the foregone private practice revenue.
We turn next to the question, what speci…cally are the social costs
of allowing dual practice, c(D) ? They arise predominantly from the
rational responses or “coping strategies” of physicians with lowincomes.
Such physician “coping” strategies are not con…ned to low-income coun-
tries. Nicholson and Souleles (2002) …nd that US physicians who experi-
enced negative income shocks (earning less than they expected) respond
by increasing hours worked and allocating more time to patient care
rather than teaching or research. Yet high-income countries often pro-
scribe arrangements like dual practice. Our theory can account for this
fact. The opportunity costs of raising public sector salaries arguably
decrease as an economy develops, until the social costs of dual practice
outweigh the costs of paying more competitive salaries in the public sec-
tor. Higher-income countries have institutional capacity to implement
relatively well-targeted (means-tested) direct transfers to the poor, and
insurance programs or other purchaser-provider splits that largely re-
move the need to assure access through public sector physicians. Nev-
ertheless, even in high-income countries, public providers often continue
to form the core of the safety net,7 and dual practice continues for some
countries and services (e.g., Italian physicians and UK dentistry).
2.0.1 Physician Sorting, Quality and Access
The oft-heardargument that allowing dual practice decreases the quality
of public sector provision ignores the counterfactual of what physician
sorting by skill level would take place in the absence of dual practice.
Clearly, dual practice gives doctors incentive to reduce hours and di-
vert attention and resources to their private practice. (We model this
formally below). While this reduces quality compared to full attention
by those same physicians to their public sector duties, this is frequently
not the correct counterfactual. Indeed, if the government cannot of-
fer salaries high enough to attract competent physicians without dual
practice perks, then access depends on allowing dual practice.
Consider physicians who di¤er in their skill level, µ. When salaries
7In the US, for example, Zuckerman and co-authors (2001) report that of the
107 hospitals nationwide with the highest market share of uncompensated care and
highest burden (measured as percentage of expenses that are uncompensated), 69.2%
were public and none was for-pro…t.
8cannot explicitly vary by skill level (because µ is noncontractible, even
if partially observable), then satisfying the participation constraint of
higher-skill physicians requires either raising all salaries to high levels
or o¤ering a non-wage bene…t that higher-skill physicians di¤erentially
value, such as dual practice. A physician’s expected bene…ts from dual
practice are likely to be higher for those who are con…dent they can
attract a lucrative private practice clientele. It is therefore natural to
assume that bene…ts b(D;µ) are such that the marginal bene…t of pri-
vate practice,
db
dD; is increasing in µ. Thus the marginal bene…t of D–the
left hand side of (2)–increases in µ. (Physician reservation utility would
presumably be increasing in skill level as well.) Perhaps ironically, allow-
ing private practice di¤erentially attracts providers of greater skill who
anticipate higher dual practice earnings, thus o¤setting the otherwise
prevalent skill-based sorting that leaves low-wage public sector facilities
starved of human capital.
Some evidence supports the assumption that
db
dD is increasing in µ.
For example, Gruen et al. (2002), in a survey of dual-practice physi-
cians in Bangladesh, found that primary-care doctors were willing to
give up private practice if paid higher salaries, but that doctors in sec-
ondary and tertiary care were far more reluctant to do so. Hicks and
Adams (2001) report that in Nepal, an initiative to promote teaching
and research by paying physicians a “non-practicing allowance” seemed
successful for basic sciences, but that “in clinical departments, many
physicians resigned their teaching positions” (p.10). Both examples are
consistent with increasing bene…ts of private practice for higher-skilled
clinicians.
Thus, low D–in the extreme, banning dual practice and strictly
enforcing rules against gratuities–reduces the attractiveness of public
service, especially for the higher-skilled physicians.
Proposition 1 The impact of dual practice on public provider quality is
theoretically ambiguous. To the extent that physicians divert attention
and e¤ort to their private practices, patients in public clinics and hospi-
tals face longer waiting times and lower quality of care. But this e¤ect
could be o¤set by the higher average quality of physicians that practice
in the government sector for any given salary level when they have legal
recourse to supplementing income from private practice.
The net impact of allowing dual practice on public sector quality of
care is thus an empirical question.
Dual-practice providers also have incentive to distort quality toward
dimensions that are observable to pro…table patients, while skimping on
9technical aspects of quality less monitorable by patients.8 Since single-
practice private physicians also have this incentive, the extent to which
dual practice a¤ects such quality distortions is also in an interesting
empirical question.
For developing countries, arguably the cost of dual practice of most
concern is the potential for providers to induce private demand among
the poor and less educated, i.e., diverting them from free public clinics
to expensive private clinics. In the next section we develop a simple
model of a dual-practice physician’s behavior, drawing upon theories of
inducement for single-practice providers by Gruber and Owings (1996)
and McGuire (2000).
2.0.2 Dual Practice Physician Behavior and Induced Demand
Consider a representative primary care physician employed in the public
sector. Assuming some government permissiveness ofdual practice(D >
0), she may choose whether or not to have a private practice, and if so,
how much of her labor time to allocate to the government health clinic
and to her private practice.
The physician receives a salary, S, which is a weakly increasing and
concave function of the amount of time spent in the public clinic, T.9
Since provider skill and e¤ort are arguably the most important deter-
minants of primary care quality, T also proxies for average government
provider quality.
A dual practice provider competes with other private providers to
attract paying patients. The provider in‡uences demand for the private
practice, q, through two channels: choice of private practice price, p, and
level of inducement, I. Inducement refers to physician e¤ort expended
on self-referrals. These referrals direct patients seen in public practice
to the private practice instead, or for the next episode of care. Given
that the physician’s skills are heavily subsidized to the patient when
practicing at the public clinic, her referral to private practice in many
cases stems more from a desire to raise income than a true belief that
the patient will be better served. Hence, I represents a kind of supplier-
8Bir and Eggleston (2001) develop a model of dual practice based on Dranove
and Satterthwaite (1992 and 2000) to illustrate provider incentives to emphasize
patient-monitorable aspects of quality over technical quality.
9Although salaries of public providers generally increase with seniority and do not
adjust explicitly according to how diligently the physician attends the public clinic,
there is usually at least some loose connection. For example, a physician hired by
the public clinic who never even initially showed up to work would presumably lose
the job. Physicians who dutifully attend the clinic and exert e¤ort on administra-
tive tasks are presumably more likely to receive promotions and associated salary
increases.
10induced demand. Total inducement I is the product of hours spent in the
public facility, T, and inducement e¤ort per hour at the public practice,
i:
I = T ¢ i (3)
Assume demand for the physician’s private practice takes the follow-
ing simple functional form:
q(p;I) = qo¡ p +d(I); (4)
where the induced part of demand, d(I), is increasing and strictly con-
cave in total inducement e¤ort: d0 > 0;d00 < 0. Note that inducement
includes both increasing the number of patients and increasing the num-
ber of services or visits per patient.
The provider derives utility from income Y and leisure L, and feels a
loss ofutility frominducement e¤ort I (McGuire and Pauly 1991; Gruber
and Owings 1996; McGuire 2000). Utility U(Y;L;I)is strictly increasing
and concave in income and leisure: UY > 0, UYY < 0, UL > 0, ULL < 0.
Inducement reduces utility at an increasing rate: UI < 0, UII < 0.
The physician’s income depends upon her public practice salary S
and net revenue from private practice, q(p;I) ¢ [p¡ a], where a is the
marginal cost of supplying a private practice visit. Leisure is the time
remainingafter workinginpublic practiceT hours andworking inprivate
practice enough to serve the demand at t hours per visit (e.g. t =
1
6).10




Y =S(T)+ q(p;I)[p ¡ a]
L=24¡ T ¡ t¢ q(p;I)
I=T ¢ i:





















10See Bir and Eggleston (2001) for a model in which increased devotion of time
and energy to a particular case are captured through higher levels of technical and
amenities quality, leading to a higher ‘e¤ective demand’ q (and lower leisure).
11The marginal bene…t of time in the public clinic, the left-hand side
of (6), includes some likelihood of higher salary (perhaps through antic-




The marginal cost of T is foregone leisure and time for private practice
(aswell as disutility frominducingdemandduringpublicpractice hours).
The marginal bene…t of time in public practice might also include
lower marginal cost of private treatment: a0(T) < 0. A physician with
both public and private practices may use public resources to treat pri-
vate patients, whether by lifting supplies (e.g., gauze, medications) or
treatingpatients atthe public facilitieswithout payingany rentor charge
for such use.11 This puts sole-private-practice physicians at a competi-
tive disadvantage vis-à-vis their dual practice counterparts.
To the extent that dual-practice physicians skimp on public practice
hours to service private patients, T¤ is below the government’s intended
level, damaging public sector quality and the goal of access.
The …rst order condition for private practice price, p¤, reveals a stan-
dard trade-o¤ between the bene…t from raising p¤ of more revenue per
patient and more leisure (from less demand), versus the cost of fewer







[p ¡ a]: (7)
The physician also chooses inducement e¤ort per hour of public prac-








The physician will induce demand up to the point where the marginal
bene…t of inducement from increased private practice revenue (the left
hand side of (8)) equals the marginal cost of less leisure and reduced
utility–since inducement exacts costs of e¤ort and “guilty conscience.”
11For example, Gruen et al. (2002) report that some of the in-depth interviews
with dual-practice providers in Bangladesh “revealed illicit practices of transfer of
subsidised resources to the private sector” (p.277). In Italy, “scandals are common,
involving doctors who purchase equipment on the public budget but then use the
equipment in their private practice” (Cutler 2002: 897).
12More generally, the pricing choice follows the usual inverse elasticity rule: the
price-cost margin is higher for consumers with less elastic demand (such as wealthier
patients). Prices are lower for more price-elastic consumers (such as middle-class
patients). With patient heterogeneity in willingness to pay, such third-degree price
discrimination can be an income-maximizing tool for the providers, and may also
help to achieve social goals of targeting public resources to the poorest.
12Competition will a¤ect the physician’s optimal choice of inducement
e¤ort. Because there is no evidence that di¤erential pricing drives the
empirical results on patterns of physician choice that we report below
(i.e., di¤erential use of private providers by the urban poor), we follow
Gruber and Owings (1996) in focusing on the physician’s choice of in-
ducement e¤ort, taking prices (and time-allocation across practices) as
given.
Let an exogenous increase in competition be represented by a de-
crease in private-practice clientele (for a given level of inducement), qo.
When qo decreases, overall private practice demand decreases. This de-
creases the physician’s income, thus increasing the marginal utility of
income and the marginal bene…t of demand inducement. A drop in pri-
vate practicedemand also increases leisure, which decreases the marginal
utility of leisure and decreases the marginal cost of demand inducement.
These e¤ects combine to create an unambiguous increase in inducement
e¤ort.
Proposition 2 Assume T ¤ and p¤ are …xed in the short-term. Increased
competition for private practice patients leads to greater demand induce-
ment from public practice: di¤
dqo < 0:
Proof. Let m ´ p¡a. Totalling di¤erentiating (8) assuming T and







UYmd00 + UYY [md0]
2 ¡ ULtd00 +ULL[td0]
2 +UII
¢ < 0: (9)
Thedenominator is negative by thesecondorderconditionfor maximiza-
tion of i¤. The numerator is positive since UYY < 0 and ULL < 0. The
proposition follows, noting that an increase in competition corresponds
to a decrease in qo.
As McGuire (2000) emphasizes, such a market-level e¤ect on induce-
ment operates through physician income e¤ects. If competition for pa-
tients drives private practice income and thus Y low, the resulting high
marginal utility of income will tend to swamp the disutility from induce-
ment, leading to greater propensity to induce demand through referrals
to private practice.
If patients di¤er in their responsiveness to inducement, physicians
will concentrate inducement e¤ort on those most likely to respond. Such
patients may not be only those of high socioeconomic status. For ex-
ample, poor patients with low education might nevertheless be referred
to the private practice if the provider suspects the patient can be easily
persuaded to pay for a private visit.
13The social costs of dual-practice physician inducement also di¤er
across patients. To the extent that patients with high demand are ra-
tioned to fewer services than they desire in the public sector, provision
of additional private services does not constitute inducement. And if
providers go beyond satisfying demand to inducing it for wealthy pa-
tients, this would seem to be a problem of second-order magnitude for
developingcountries. Inducementfocusedonthewealthymay contribute
tocost escalation in thehealth sector, but italsoallows subsidized public
healthcare resources to be better targeted onthe poor. Of much greater
concern is the possibility that providers will exploit poor patients of low
education or otherwise most susceptible to inducement by persuading
them to pay for expensive private treatment instead of subsidized public
care.
Wenext empirically examine consumerchoiceofprimary care provider
in Indonesia, where dual practice is prevalent. Unfortunately data limi-
tations and lack of exogenous variation in dual practice conditions pre-
clude a direct test of inducement behavior. Instead we focus on whether
measurable quality can explain patient choice of provider, and whether
thepropensity oflower-incomepatients touseexpensive private providers
di¤ers across areas where providers face di¤erent competition for pa-
tients, such as in urban versus rural areas.
3 Indonesian Primary Care and Dual Practice
Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world, unites 13,000
islands of an archipelago that houses 300 distinct ethnolinguistic groups
(Hugo et al. 1987). At the time of the …rst Indonesian Family Life Sur-
vey (IFLS) in 1993, Indonesia’s economy was growing rapidly, and health
indicators were improving. In 1990, annual expenditures on health
amounted to only 2% of GDP, or $12 per capita. In both indicators
of health care activities and in expenditure patterns, the national …g-
ures mask a great deal of regional variation.
Most Indonesians do not have health insurance. The public sector
health care delivery system is extensive and provides implicit coverage
by charging patients only about …ve percent ofaverage cost (World Bank
1994). The extent to which this public spending e¤ectively targets the
poor is “a long-standing concern in Indonesia” (van de Walle 1995: 227).
Government health centers are the centerpiece of the government
strategy for primary care. Each sub-district has at least one health
center, and urban areas with higher population density may have more
than one. There are 5,600 centers for 3,400 sub-districts (Frankenberg
and Karoly 1995). Health centers are responsible for medical care, fam-
ily planning, communicable disease control, environmental health and
14sanitation, health education, lab services, and recording and reporting.
A medical doctor, usually a recent graduate serving her required term of
public service after medical school, typically heads the center. In remote
areas some centers share a physician.
Private sector delivery of primary care is well established in Indone-
sia, as is the government’s recognition that the private sector can supple-
ment public primary care services. The majority of public sector health
workers provide care in the private sector in the evening, either through
their own practice or a private clinic or hospital. Villagers typically
have access to one doctor, one nurse-midwife and several paramedics in
private practice.
As mentioned previously, the data allow us to separate “ownership
e¤ects” from “quality e¤ects” to see whether “publicness” or “private-
ness” in‡uence consumer choice after controlling for measured dimen-
sions of price and quality. A priori the ownership e¤ect is ambiguous.
Ownership could re‡ect the collective reputation of providers in a sec-
tor or unmeasured aspects of quality and convenience. If consumers use
non-pro…t status as a signal of trust (Arrow 1963; Hansmann 1980), an
ownership e¤ect could favor the public sector. Yet Indonesian public
health facilities seem to have a poor reputation (World Bank 1989), so
that reputation and quality-premium explanations could be consistent
with an ownership e¤ect that favors the private sector.
Because historically physicians began with obligatory training in
public facilities and moved on into splitting their time, physicians with
private practices might have better reputations and be more experienced
than those with only public practices. This career pattern would sug-
gest that despite the high prevalence of dual practice, there is still some
residual sorting by skill between sectors. As shown in Table 1, physi-
cianswith asingle private practice onaveragereport more than twice the
years in practice as physicians practicing only at government facilities,
with dual-practice physicians falling in between. Physicians in private
practices are the most likely to speak the regional language, followed by
those with dual practice and lastly those with only a public sector po-
sition. Private-practice-only physicians are also most likely to originate
from the province in which they work.
In Indonesia, practicing medicine in the public sector carries prestige
and some non-pecuniary bene…ts associated with civil service, including
training, housing bene…ts, the potential to generate a private clientele,
and astable albeit small salary. These bene…ts come at the relatively low
costof devoting some timeto apublicfacility. Generally, physicianhours
in public practice are not monitored, and anecdotal evidence suggests
that many spend most of their time in private practices (captured in
15the model as low T¤). The most sought-after public positions are those
in areas with the best potential for lucrative private practices, typically
those with fewer competing providers but an adequate clientele. Public
promotion is largely based on seniority, which reinforces the tendency
to be minimally present in one’s public practice. The bene…ts of private
practice are mostly extra income, and charges are far above the fees
for public care. For comparison, in India, private fees increase with
specializationandyears of practice, andthe likelihoodof having asecond
(dual) practice increases with the number of dependents a physician has
(Chawla 1996).
Figure 1 shows the average allocation of work hours among tasks for
Indonesian government-center physicians who only work at the center
(‘public physicians’) and those who also have a private practice (‘dual
practice physicians’). Dual practice physicians spend less time examin-
ing patients and doing administrative work, but more time engaged in
…eld work, than single-practice physicians. This data is consistent with
the incentives of multitasking when some tasks (e.g., …eld work) are less
easily monitored (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
4 Empirical Analysis of Patient Choice of Provider
Our empirical analysis focuses on estimating patient demand q(:) when
dual practice is prevalent. Since data limitations preclude directly test-
ing for the impact on demand patterns of an exogenous change in dual
practice incentives, we instead focus on whether measurable quality can
explain patient choice of provider, and whether the propensity of lower-
income patients to use expensive private providers di¤ers across areas
where competition for patients di¤ers, such as in urban versus rural ar-
eas.
The data used in these analyses links the household and community
survey components of the …rst (1993) round of the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS). The sample is representative of about 83% of the
Indonesian populationandcontains over30,000individuals livingin 13 of
the 27 provinces in the country.13 The number of individual respondents
in the household survey was 33,082. Of these, 4,275 (13%) were users
of outpatient health care in the past four weeks. The sample used in
13The original IFLS sampling scheme balanced the costs of surveying the more
remote and sparsely-populated regions of Indonesia against the bene…ts of captur-
ing the ethnic and socioeconomic diversity of the country. Within 13 provinces, the
scheme randomly sampled households from 321 enumeration areas, which were se-
lected from a nationally representative sample. A complex weighting scheme for the
data is available, but has not been used in this analysis, since the results are not
intended to be generalizable to the entire Indonesian population.
16this analysis includes the 2,373 people who chose to visit a physician in
a health center or private practice.
Measures of infrastructure quality and availability of services were
constructed from the Community-Facility Survey, which included gov-
ernment health centers and private providers (private clinics and the
private practices of doctors, midwives, nurses, and paramedics). The
sampling methodology could introduce several potential biases. Because
facilities wererankedinorder of the frequency withwhich householdsur-
vey respondents mentioned them, the quality measures could be higher
than average. Moreover, since consumers would likely choose the best
quality public facility without much regard for price, but to balance
price and quality when selecting a private facility, the sampled facilities
probably include the best quality public facilities and mediocre-quality
private facilities with reasonable prices. Because in most areas there
is only one full health center (although there are several subcenters),
the choice of health center as a facility to survey is not likely to su¤er
from this bias. For private facilities the sampling method is more of a
concern; the quality measures of the sampled facilities probably do not
re‡ect the highest private quality available, but rather the quality level
most frequently chosen.
The consumer and community surveys can be linked. Match rates
between household questionnaire sections and health facilities were close
to 90% for public health centers and 40% for private doctors and clinics.
The IFLS data o¤ers a relatively rich set of price and quality data for
public and private providers (see Appendix).
4.1 Speci…cation
The dependent variable is an indicator for the facility that a particular
household chose to visit out of the neighborhood facilities available to it,
given a visit in the four-week recall period. A neighborhood is de…ned
to be an enumeration area.14 We only use …rst visits.15
The independent variables include characteristics of the consumer
(gender, age, education, householdincome, wealth, andseverity ofsymp-
14Although enumeration areas are administratively determined, there is some ev-
idence that they correspond to markets. Of those responding that they had sought
outpatient care, 91% had sought care in their enumeration area. Four percent re-
ceived care outside of their home province, which leaves only 5% who may live on
the border of an enumeration area and choose to seek care in the neighboring area.
15This conservative restriction means that any patterns of choice consistent with
physician inducement that we identify will represent an underestimate of the full
social costs of inducement, since it excludes repeat visits, which are even more within
a physician’s control.
17toms16) and characteristics of the provider such as price and quality,
waiting time, how much time physicians spend with patients, hours
open and other amenities. Price variables include the provider-reported
price associated with a visit and provider-reported per-unit cost associ-
ated with penicillin. Structural quality variables include scores on ba-
sic equipment, drug availability, and room cleanliness. Process quality
was measured with constructed scores on family planning, prenatal care,
cough and cold, and diarrhea and vomiting case studies. The appendix
provides more details on these price and quality measures. Finally, since
the convenience of not skipping work to see the doctor may a¤ect choice,
we include a measure of ‡exible provider hours (evening availability).17
Since public and private providers do not di¤er signi…cantly in number
of patients seen per hour, and in preliminary regressions this measure
was not signi…cant, it is not included in the speci…cations reported here.
Using community survey information addresses the selection problem
that arises when using quality reports from only those who had chosen
to use facilities, as well as the problem of only having facility charac-
teristics for chosen facilities.18 Because there is evidence that certain
provider-reported dimensions of quality are correlated with consumers’
perceptions of quality, this approach has merit.19
Previous studies of consumer choice ofprovider (e.g., Gertler and van
der Gaag 1990) have focused on the multinomial and nested multino-
mial logit models, thus accepting that the errors are identical across
provider alternatives, though they may or may not be independent. To
16Education is a categorical variable describing those who report their highest level
of schooling to be no schooling or grade school (0), and those who report anything
higher than grade school (1). The household income includes both the individual la-
bor and the family non-labor income components. These components were summed
for each household member, then summed over members of the household and at-
tributed to all members of the household. Income is reported in thousands of 1993
Rupiah. The list of symptoms includes headache, toothache, sore eyes, cough, cold
and ‡u, vomiting, chest pain, asthma, fever, infections, diarrhea, and rheumatism.
Positive responses per person are summed for symptoms reported in the past 4 weeks.
17From providers’ reported hours each day, providers reporting working from 5-7
any evening are assigned a 1; those who work only between 8am-5pm are given a 0.
18When facility-speci…c information is not available for the full set of providers
available, typically the average of a characteristic by facility type within enumeration
area is used.
19Provider quality, at least in terms of measures of process quality, has been shown
to be correlated with consumers’ perceptions of quality and outcomes (Peabody et
al. 1995). It is also intuitive that the thoroughness of the physician in the process
measures would be related to patient satisfaction because time spent with the physi-
cian and service intensity have been shown to improve patient satisfaction (Orient et
al. 1983; Marton et al. 1982). Availability of basic supplies, equipment and drugs
are also often correlated with patient satisfaction.
18preview, the present study rejects the multinomial logit and the nested
multinomial logit in favor of non-identical but independent random er-
rors with the HEV model (Greene 1993). Assuming non-identical errors
has implications for which determinants of choice are statistically and
economically signi…cant.
4.2 Descriptive Results
As shown in Table 2, the public sector has higher scores than the private
sector for structural quality measures, except for equipment. Interest-
ingly, although the private providers score high on equipment available
(which perhaps is quite observable to patients), they score lower than
public providers do on whether the equipment was functional, a mea-
sure of quality that patients can less readily observe. Contrary to the
perception that private facilities are better maintained and thus more
attractive to consumers, public facilities score better on the cleanliness
composite. Private sector process quality scores are lower than those
of public providers for family planning, prenatal care services, and gas-
trointestinal upset, but higher for cough and cold. This pattern may
re‡ect the e¤ort focused on family planning and prenatal care and the
use of treatment protocols in the public sector.
Private care is almost always available during evening hours, and
public care rarely is. Both public and private providers see somewhere
between 20-30 patients per hour. Thedi¤erence is not signi…cant, except
that public providers do not see any patients on Sunday, and private
providers do.20
The large price di¤erence for treatment costs is the most dramatic
di¤erence between public and private providers. The private exam fee
alone is on average ten times that for public providers. Price di¤erences
for penicillinand paracetomol are also large, albeit less signi…cantly so.21
Women, people in rural areas, and those with less education seek
public care in greater numbers (Table 3). In most other groups, just
under half of those seeking care go to the private sector. In urban areas,
slightly more than halfvisit privatefacilities. Although themean income
of those seeking public care is much lower than the mean income of
20These numbers, especially for the public sector, are subject to measurement error
because they are “reported hours practiced” divided by “number of patients seen.”
In some cases the latter number may include all patients of the health center, not
simply those seen by one physician.
21Data constraints prevent us from adjusting the per-unit provider-reported prices
to account for whether larger numbers of units are prescribed in the private sector.
Private physicians give prescriptions far more often, but this pattern may re‡ect the
fact that patients at public clinics often receive the drugs directly. The di¤erences in
travel time, travel cost and waiting time are small on average.
19those seeking private care, those in the lowest as well as highest income
quartiles seek private care more than do those in the middle quartiles.
This utilization of private care by the poorest patients is worrisome for
policymakers seeking to target public …nancing of government clinics on
the poor.
4.3 Multivariate Results
We present results for three models—multinomial logit, nested multino-
mial logit, and the heteroscedastic extreme value model (Table 4). The
dependent variable in all three cases is an indicator for which facility a
consumer chose, given all the facilities in their area. For identi…cation
purposes, we interact the demographic variables22 with a set of facility
dummies for the …rst public facility (usually the area’s health center).
Positive coe¢cients on demographic variables indicate that a speci…c
group is more likely to seek care from a public health center relative to
other providers.
Since distance to provider and travel time did not vary much by
provider type, and since these were consumer reports that would be en-
dogenous and unavailable for the randomly matched part of the sample,
these are not included in the …nal speci…cation.
Three tests indicate that multinomial logit is not the ideal model in
this case. First, the Hausman-McFaddentestindicates that the Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is violated (Â2= 72.5, 19df,
p<0.0005). This means that inference based on the multinomial logit
model (MNL) could be misleading due to ine¢cient and inconsistent pa-
rameter estimates. Second, the inclusive values from the nested model
aresigni…cant. This means that thenested model does not simply reduce
to the MNL, because errors are correlated among choices. Finally, the
likelihood ratio test accepts the nesting restriction on the simple MNL.
There is clearly some correlation between the errors of the di¤erent al-
ternatives. The nested model cannot be rejected as a restriction on the
HEV model (LLR=-2, p<.8). Nevertheless, because the inclusive value
for the private providers is negative, this tree structure may not be the
best.
Since the inclusive values represent the utility consumers get from
the particular type of choice, negative signs typically indicate that the
nested model is inconsistent with the assumptions of utility maximiza-
tion. The HEVmodel, which allows all alternatives to havenon-identical
errors (Greene 1993), thus seems most appropriate. Nevertheless, it is
22These variables include gender, age, urban residence, education, household size,
income, severity of illness, and a dummy variable for those in the lowest income
quartile.
20instructive to consider which results hold across the three models, since
such results evidently are robust to di¤erent assumptions about the cor-
relation of error terms.
Examining the signs, magnitudes and signi…cance of the coe¢cients
can be informative. However, because of the nonlinearity of the logit
function, e¤ects are best interpreted through predicted probabilities
based on the HEV model, which we present below. Because the HEV
model treats the errors associated with provider alternatives as inde-
pendent but not identical, the e¤ects of price and quality changes for a
particular sector may not be uniform across facilities in a sector. For
example, a public sector quality increase would be expected to lead to a
higher predicted probability that all public sector facilities would be cho-
sen by consumers. Predicted probabilities of choice based on the nested
multinomial logit model would constrain quality changes in the public
sector to a¤ect all public sector facilities in the same way. The assump-
tion of the HEV model that errors are not identical across providers
allows for heteroscedasticity, which also a¤ects the sign, magnitude and
signi…cance of determinants of choice.
4.3.1 Price e¤ect
The visit fee charged by a provider is inversely related to the probability
that a particular provider will be chosen, consistent with (4) and (7).
This expected e¤ect is signi…cant in all three models, and is of a similar
albeit small magnitude. Higher costs associated with drugs are posi-
tively associated with choice, but are not signi…cant. One might expect
price sensitivity to vary with income. However, models interacting a
dummy variable for income (lowest or highest quartile) with price found
no signi…cant interaction e¤ect.
To illustrate consumer sensitivity to price changes, we look at the
di¤erences in the predictedprobabilities in response to visit fee increases
in public and private facilities (Table 5). As expected, a 20% increase
in the price of a public visit makes people slightly more likely to seek
care in the private sector. A 20% increase in private price appears to
have no signi…cant e¤ect on the choice of provider overall. These results
are consistent with the idea that more price-sensitive consumers choose
the heavily subsidized public providers, whereas those choosing private
providers are less price sensitive (although the price elasticity of demand
for anindividual private practicephysician could bequitehigh). Overall,
price increases do not have a large e¤ect on demand, given large initial
price di¤erences between sectors.
From the provider’s perspective, lack of sensitivity to price creates a
good environment for dual practice, since patients may be more willing
21to switch from public to private provision. From the government’s per-
spective, however, lack of price sensitivity raises concerns that private
sector demand may be induced. Moreover, lack of evidence for di¤er-
ential price sensitivity by income suggest that referral of patients from
public to private practice may not be concentrated only on those of high
income.
4.3.2 Quality E¤ect
Of the di¤erent quality measures, structural elements of quality most
visible to patients seem to be the most important determinants of con-
sumer choice of provider. In this case the single measure of quality that
is signi…cant across models is the index of equipment, which is positively
related to choice except in the simple multinomial model. The index of
room cleanliness was signi…cant in the …rst two models and has a posi-
tive e¤ect on choice. In the HEV model the e¤ect is small, negative and
not signi…cant. The existence of evening hours is signi…cant in the …rst
two models as well, although it is of a di¤erent sign in the two models.
The process quality measures, based on providers’ responses to par-
ticular cases, most closely re‡ect technical quality. It is not surprising
that consumers are less sensitive to this measure of quality, although
if tested together these measures are signi…cant and positive.23 Drug
availability and evening hours do not signi…cantly a¤ect choice in the
HEV model.
Simulations of how patients would respond to increased private sec-
tor quality reveal small shifts in patient demand from public to private
providers (Table 6). The shifts are generally quite small, since a 20%
increase in the equipment index corresponds to approximately two basic
supplies being made available; consumers are unlikely to be very sensi-
tive to the presence of bandages or a new diagnostic dye.
Looking at price and quality results together, it is clear that the
magnitude of the e¤ect of quality is larger than the magnitude of the
e¤ect of price. The dimensions of quality that consumers respond most
readily to are those that are most visible to them. This result indicates
an ideal situation for self-referral, since visible quality shifts demand
23The process measures for family planning (in the …rst two models) and prenatal
care (in all three models) are negative when disaggregated, indicating that there
may be speci…c facilities that are known for providing this type of care that are not
part of the choice set for those who require general primary care. It is also possible
that the Hawthorne e¤ect, by exaggerating the desirable responses to case questions,
minimizes di¤erences between providers. In the descriptive statistics, however, there
were signi…cant di¤erences between public and private providers on process measures
for three out of four cases. Each score also displays substantial variation around the
mean.
22more than does price. A remaining question of policy signi…cance is
whether demand shifts occur for the higher income consumers, or across
the income ranges.
4.3.3 Ownership E¤ect
The results indicate that, all else equal, patients weakly prefer public
over private providers. That is, after controlling for price and measur-
able quality, the residual e¤ect of “publicness” on consumer choice is
positive, albeit small. However, the coe¢cient on public ownership is
not statistically signi…cant in the HEV model. This provides some evi-
dence that in the most general speci…cation, relaxing assumptions on the
error terms of alternative providers, ownership does not seem to matter.
This lends credence to the idea that our measures of price and quality
capture the important determinants of provider choice. Moreover, since
theactual provider is in many cases the same personregardless of owner-
ship, this …nding of no residual “ownership e¤ect” is not that surprising.
Aspects of quality that may not be readily observable are more similar
across public and private providers when the same physicians practice
in both sectors.
4.3.4 Socioeconomic and demographic e¤ects
As noted above, to identify the model, we must interact demographic
variables with a set of facility dummies. Results for demographic vari-
ables are given for all public facilities relative to all private ones. The
utility function for choice of facility (facility 1-8) based on facility char-
acteristics is allowed to di¤er from the utility of the choice of sector in
which to seek care (public or private), which is based on individual char-
acteristics. Therefore, the HEV model results indicate that those with
higher incomes are less likely to use public facilities than are those with
middle incomes, larger households, more symptoms and more education.
Those in the lowest income quintile are also less likely to choose public
facilities relative to those in the middle income quartiles, although this
result is not signi…cant except in the nested model. Urban and male
consumers are more likely to choose the largest public facility.
Compared to the original estimates, predicted probabilities based
on particular demographic groups (Tables 7A and 7B) show that the
poor are about 3% less likely to use public care as the overall popula-
tion. Those in rural areas are 2% more likely to seek care from public
providers, while those in urban areas are more than 3% less likely to see
public providers.
The urban population, especially the urban poor, is less likely to use
public providers than their rural counterparts. The change in predicted
probability for the urban poor is more than 4%, compared to 3% for
23the urban non-poor. The rural non-poor are almost 3% more likely to
choose public providers, and the rural poor appear to use public care
only slightly less than the overall population.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Allowing dual practice enables governments to provide access to basic
health services through government-employed physicians of reasonable
quality, while paying low salaries. Governments can meet the participa-
tion constraint of physicians without paying salaries commensurate to
physicians’ abilities because physicians also value the “perk” or “non-
salary bene…t” of the opportunity to earn signi…cant private practice
revenues. Several policy studies have noted the strong positive corre-
lation between low public sector salaries and private income-generating
activities. For example, a WHO summary of ten country case studies24
found “a tendency for professionals in the public sector to spend most
of their time and energy in private practice, or to charge informal fees,
where salary levels are low or pay is delayed” (Hicks and Adams 2001:
9). The …rst incentives listed for recruiting public-sector physicians, af-
ter payingcompetitive salaries, are “allowing after-hours private practice
in public institutions” (which was considered successful in Bahrain) and
“tolerating informal payments” (ibid). In fact, some policies explicitly
trade o¤ allowance of private practice with cash payments. Examples
include paying doctors a “non-practicing allowance” to encourage teach-
ing and research in lieu of private practice (ibid), or o¤ering higher cash
wages to physicians in rural areas explicitly to o¤set more limited rural
opportunities for private-practice revenue.
Dual practice also provides aneasy source ofprivatepatients through
self-referral induced demand from the public sector. Since the wealthy
have a higher willingness to pay for care, self-interested providers would
rationally seek to focus inducement e¤ort on these patients. Physician
altruism would reinforce this behavior, since altruistic providers should
be even more inclined to counsel poor patients to receive free or sub-
sidized care in the public clinic or hospital, while referring only those
most clearly able to pay to their private practice.
Thus, dual practice can boost physician incomes while simultane-
ously promoting e¢cient sorting of consumers across sectors. However,
physician incentives to concentrate inducement on those most respon-
sive to inducement–often the poor and uneducated–may act counter to
such a social objective. Dual practice also gives incentive for physicians
24The ten countries were Bahrain, Bangladesh,Côte d’Ivoire, Estonia, Ghana, Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal and New Zealand.
24to skimp on public practice duties and to ‘free ride’ on public facilities
(by appropriating supplies and using public equipment without paying
rent). An appropriate policy response would be to promote transparent
contractual relationships between public and private practices, such as
rental of facilities and sub-contracting for speci…c services.
Physician self-referral to private practice would only constitute “un-
due in‡uence,” and hence induced demand, if the incremental quality of
private services does not justify the much higher patient price for care.
Unsurprisingly, when surveyed about why patients in Bangladesh seek
private care when free services are available in public facilities, dual-
practice physicians suggested that patients were paying for aspects of
quality, such as short waiting times, cleanliness and better interpersonal
aspectsof care. Perhaps moreinterestingly, twelve percentofBangladesh
dual-practice physicians agreed with the viewthat patients using private
services are badly informed, and four percent agreed with the view that
doctors divert patients to private practice (Gruen et al. 2002: 274-5).
Our empirical results of Indonesian consumer choice of provider, al-
though falling short of a direct “test” of dual practice behavior, nev-
ertheless are consistent with the incentives identi…ed with dual prac-
tice. Consumers’ choice of private providers cannot be fully explained
by higher quality of care or convenience of ‡exible hours. Because of
the labor-sharing between sectors in Indonesia, the e¤ects of provider
quality sorting are attenuated to some degree. Moreover, the ownership
e¤ect (controlling for price and measurable aspects of quality), when
signi…cant, favors the public sector.
Unfortunately, this analysis does not provide a de…nitive answer to
the question of why the poorest, especially in urban areas, choose ex-
pensive private providers over heavily subsidized public ones. Because
all modeling e¤orts interacting the dummy for lowest quartile of income
with visit price, drug price, and quality measures were not conclusive, it
does not seem that price and quality di¤erentially a¤ect the low-income
consumers. Possible explanations include greater availability of private
providers (although the empirical analysis includes travel time), and
greater segmentation of healthcare delivery in urban areas.25 Further
research with even more detailed data might usefully focus on disentan-
gling these competing hypotheses.
Although the data preclude addressing dual practice referrals di-
rectly, it is plausible that the higher density ofphysicians in urban areas,
and hence greater competition for private practice patients, leads to in-
25Disproportionate use of private providers by poor urban residents might re‡ect
use of such providers by migrant laboring men for coughs and colds, while public
clinics specialize in family planning and prenatal care.
25creases in referrals from public to private practices. Such referrals could
be consistent with e¢cient patient sorting and altruism if physicians
cross-subsidize poor patients with charges from rich patients. However,
since public sector care is already essentially free for patients, it is un-
clear why an altruistic provider would not prefer to “cross-subsidize”
the poor by treating them at the public practice while referring only the
wealthier patients to private practice. Moreover, although di¤erences
in provider altruism across urban and rural areas might account for the
observed patterns of choice, this seems less plausible than the theoretical
prediction of greater inducement in competitive urban areas.26
The literature on physician-induced demand suggests that induce-
ment is more likely and of greater magnitude when income e¤ects are
strong (McGuire and Pauly 1991; McGuire 2000). Given the low in-
comes of most Indonesian public sector physicians, it seems likely that
inducement of poor patients to private practice in competitive urban
areas is consistent with large income e¤ects.
If provider dual practice and self-referral are important explanations
for care-seeking patterns for Indonesian primary care, then physicians
may be exploiting the poor and less educated when competitive pres-
sures are higher. Unfortunately the data do not allow identifying other
potential social costs of dual practice, such as the extent to which doc-
tors divert public sector resources to their private practices. It is also
unclear what the administrative and social costs would be of enforcing a
ban on dual practice. Arguably Indonesians bene…t from greater access
to care when competent physicians, attracted partly by the freedom to
engage in dual practice, remain in the public sector. Further analysis of
why poor Indonesians and patients in other developing countries choose
expensive private providers over subsidized public ones might usefully
focus on identifying exogenous variation in dual practice conditions that
would allow a direct test of inducement behavior, as well as even more
detailed data on dimensions of quality that might di¤erentially attract
poor patients.
26A survey of dual-practice physicians in Bangladesh found that “fears of too much
competition between doctors was more pronounced in metropolitan areas where the
physician density is higher than in other areas of the country” (Gruen et al. 2002:
274). It is interesting to note that for a much di¤erent context–the 1970s US–Pauly
(1980) also found an “availability e¤ect,” when present at all, most notable for the
lower-income and lower-educated patients in urban areas.
26A Appendix: The IFLS 1993 Quality and Price
Measures
TheIFLS1993 dataincludeseveral di¤erent quality measures. Thetypes
and numbers of health instruments (e.g., stethoscopes) available in the
facility were reported by providers and observed by the researchers per-
forming the survey.27 Providers reported whether they had basic equip-
ment available to them, and independent observers reportedon the room
condition, drug and vaccine availability. This means that within a public
facility, there will be no variation between individual providers, because
typically only one provider per facility (usually the facility director) is
surveyed. There is variation between public facilities. Direct observa-
tion helps to avoid the common pitfall with facility-based surveys that
responses do not re‡ect the day-to-day reality. Structural measures of
quality were constructed from data on the availability of basic equip-
ment, more sophisticated equipment, drugs and vaccines. In each case,
responses to questions like “does your facility have x?” were summed
and normalized. In the case of drugs and vaccines, responses re‡ect the
number of drugs or vaccines that were available that day. Another struc-
tural quality measure uses information on observed facility cleanliness.
Each interviewed provider was also asked to respond to several clini-
cal vignettes: an o¢ce visit for the purpose of obtaining an IUD, a preg-
nancy check up, carefor aninfant with diarrhea andvomiting symptoms,
and care for an adult with cough and fever. In each case the provider
was given the highest score for spontaneously reporting a step that was
necessary, and a lowscore for not reporting performing a necessary step.
Eachcase included approximately 20di¤erent steps. The cases wereonly
presented to providers who stated they did provide the related care.28
We constructed process quality indices for each of the four types of care
by summing the responses to the di¤erent questions posed.29
27For provider-reported information, reports are validated by a second set of ques-
tions asking if available equipment functions. Correlations between the score for
having equipment and reporting that equipment was functional are above 85%, so
just reports of whether equipment was present are used. Directly observed assess-
ments of room cleanliness, vaccine and drug availability and storage were not reported
by providers.
28Because all the steps were positive ones that should be performed, we did not
include in the quality indices information on steps that the provider mentioned only
after interviewer prompting.
29These responses were yes or no; yes was correct and coded as 1. The responses
were not assigned di¤erent weights, because there is no consensus on the evidence
that would help to determine weights.
Three potential sources of bias plague this collection of provider process quality
information. The Hawthorne e¤ect—that even asking or observing the respondent
27The price variable that is the focus of this analysis is expected con-
sumer cost of visiting the di¤erent providers in their choice set, including
drug costs and opportunity cost of travel and waiting time (Gertler and
van der Gaag 1990). Ideally, all respondents to the household survey
would report expected price of treatment, drugs, and time involved in
seeing each type of provider. Unfortunately, this information is not
available. We instead employ provider reports of fees. There are three
advantages to using these prices to re‡ect ex ante treatment costs. First,
they are available for all facilities, including the ones not chosen by a
particular household. Second, these prices are una¤ected by who de-
cides to use care and what choices they make, i.e., they are exogenous
to each individual consumer. Third, provider-reported prices should re-
‡ect the consumer’s expectation of treatment and drug cost associated
with a visit, at least in terms of the relative magnitude of costs between
provider options.
Informationondrugpriceswas missing for alargenumberof providers
except in the case of penicillin. Because penicillin is frequently used in
both public and private sectors, it seemed reasonable to use its reported
price per unit as a proxy for drug prices. There is some indication that
di¤erent courses of penicillin are prescribed by providers in di¤erent sec-
tors, so we used the price per unit.30 Information on travel time and
waiting time are only available from the household survey, and thus
su¤er from the selection problems mentioned above.
A …nal measure involves the opportunity cost of a visit. A leading
hypothesis for the use of the private sector by the poor inEgypt centered
on the availability of after-hours care. Although the value of time for
poor people is less than for the wealthy if it is calculated using the wage
as a measure of opportunity cost, perhaps the poor are much less ‡exible
in their time so that the availability of evening hours is an important
would alter their answers to make them more favorable—is di¢cult to avoid in sur-
veys. The second potential bias is that the director of the health sector would likely
choose a better-performing sta¤ member to respond to questions. For both of these
reasons, the information collected from providers on quality is considered an upper
bound. Because the Hawthorne e¤ect is present in both public and private provider
responses, it is unlikely to distort the results of quality comparisons between sectors.
Typically there would not be much choice in which physicians to ask to respond,
since in both sectors there is usually only one physician present. The third bias,
and one that may overestimate the public sector process reports, is that the use of
protocols is more developed within the public sector.
30One drawback in using penicillin is that the variation in price between sectors is
small. Certain painkillers had a much larger variation in price between sectors. There
is also a di¤erence between use of branded versus generic drugs in the two sectors
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Public practice only 3.70 86% 27.64
Dual practice* 5.80 93% 26.90
Private practice only 8.04 94% 0.00
*Public-sector physicians reporting a private practice.
Source: Authors’ analysis of Indonesian Family Life Survey 1993 data.1
TABLE 2.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Unit Obs Mean
Public
SD Mean Private SD T stat Min Max
Structural Quality
structure-room score 315 0.54 0.19 0.32 0.12 17.4* 0 1
structure-drug score 315 0.67 0.11 0.41 0.27 16.1* 0 1
structure-vaccines score 315 0.68 0.28 0.22 0.34 18.9* 0 1
structure- functional score 315 0.40 0.13 0.29 0.23 7.1* 0 1
structure- equipment score 315 0.49 0.13 0.73 0.15 22.0* 0 1
Process Quality
process-family planning score 315 0.44 0.18 0.32 0.20 21.5* 0 1
process-prenatal care score 315 0.49 0.13 0.26 0.24 19.2* 0 1
process-cough, cold score 315 0.44 0.14 0.45 0.21 1.0 0 1
process-GI upset score 315 0.31 0.07 0.30 0.13 7.8* 0 1
Outcome Quality
second visit in 4 wks yes/no 321 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.15 0 1
Amenity Quality
evening hours yes/no 315 0.19 0.31 0.99 0.09 43.6* 0 1
patients per hour Monday 305 23 36 24 29 .2 0 264
patients per hour Tuesday 315 27 44 22 25 .7 1 420
patients per hour Wednesday 314 27 39 23 25 .7 1 360
patients per hour Thursday 315 28 45 21 23 1.1 1 420
patients per hour Friday 312 19 27 25 27 1.2 1 270
patients per hour Saturday 263 29 49 21 24 1.0 1 360
patients per hour Sunday 320 0 0 16 8 40.4* 0 30
given prescription yes/no 321 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.24 6.3 0 1
saw doctor yes/no 321 0.31 0.32 0.44 0.33 1.8 0 1
Price Variables
cost of penicillin Rp/1000mg 198 0.06 0.00 9.44 0.07 1.4 0 1
cost of paracetomol Rp/1000mg 122 0.05 0.00 21.82 0.16 1.9 0 1
exam fee rupiah/visit 315 388 156 3767 2572 23.2* 0 20000
distance kilometers 321 16 81 13 54 1.5 0 1000
travel time minutes 321 25 43 21 35 1.3 0 610
waiting time minutes 321 27 35 29 30 .3 0 475
travel cost rupiah 321 304 612 334 414 1.5 0 5833
* Indicates that the T statistic testing Ho that means are equal for public and private providers could be
rejected (p<0.05).2
TABLE 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WHO REPORT USING PRIMARY CARE (4 WEEK RECALL)
Demographic Public Private
N % N %
Male 686 54 594 46
Female 1408 66 740 34
Age 15-29 432 61 274 39
Age 30-44 758 61 482 39
Age 45-59 500 60 334 40
Age 60+ 332 61 212 39
Urban 878 47 980 53
Rural 1216 77 354 23
Education (high) 510 43 664 57
Education (low) 1582 70 670 30
Income quartile (lowest) 506 52 464 48
538 71 218 29
598 70 260 30
Income quartile (highest) 452 54 392 46
Healthy (self-report) 1476 62 912 38
Sick (self-report) 618 59 422 413
TABLE 4: RESULTS OF MULTINOMIAL, NESTED AND HEV MODELS
MNL NMNL HEV
Variable Coeff P[|Z|>z] Coeff P[|Z|>z] Coeff P[|Z|>z]
PUBLIC 1.09297** 0.0000 2.30060** 0.00000 0.36179 0.13830
VISIT_FEE -0.00006** 0.0000 -0.00003** 0.00260 -0.00005** 0.00000
DRUG_FEE 0.73845 0.6252 3.12523 0.24660 0.74540 0.63850
PR_FP -0.05675 0.6709 -0.12692 0.37890 0.01484 0.91640
PR_PNC -0.25970 0.0761 -0.17558 0.27710 -0.14913 0.34570
PR_COLD 0.00885 0.1929 0.00993 0.17710 0.00462 0.52830
PR_GASTR 0.55632 0.0548 0.31579 0.32330 -0.13788 0.64960
DRUGAVAI 0.37911** 0.0031 0.50608 0.00040 -0.01784 0.89710
EQUIPMT -0.23337** 0.0010 0.36026** 0.01420 0.97343** 0.00000
ROOM 0.07951** 0.0000 0.63389** 0.00010 -0.26958 0.09680
FLEX 0.02413** 0.0001 -0.20595** 0.02040 -0.02972 0.72440
INCOME 0.02944** 0.0347 -0.13466** 0.00000 -0.04952 0.11270
HLDSIZE 0.03913** 0.0494 -0.00543 0.83400 -0.11561** 0.00010
SYMPTOM 0.13665** 0.0040 -0.11967 0.08690 -0.31821** 0.00010
URBAN -0.59172** 0.0000 -0.27922 0.07400 0.41350** 0.00410
MALE -0.02336 0.8034 1.47748 0.15650 9.09845** 0.00000
EDUC 0.20223 0.0996 -0.00464 0.15280 -0.11662 0.30050
LOW -0.00046 0.8771 -1.70222** 0.00000 -0.29796 0.42040
AGE 0.36312 0.0595 0.15038 0.26090 0.00184 0.50610
Inclusive
values
 PUB     0.42773** 0.01490    
PRIV     -0.48615** 0.01250    










Note: Demographic effects are for choice of the public sector versus the private sector.4





Public price +20% Std err Private price +20% Std
err
Public 1 .3223 .13 .3216 .08 .3227 .13
Public 2 .1355 .03 .1352 .03 .1350 .02
Public 3 .0930 .02 .0930 .03 .0927 .02
Public 4 .0846 .02 .0844 .03 .0833 .02
.6354 .6342 .6337
Private 1 .1224 .04 .1215 .04 .1238 .04
Private 2 .0912 .03 .0930 .03 .0933 .04
Private 3 .0768 .02 .0770 .02 .0759 .02
Private 4 .0743 .02 .0746 .01 .0739 .02
.3647 .3661 .36695












Public 1 .3223 .13 .3126 .18 .3185 .18 .3094 .09 .3182 .13
Public 2 .1355 .03 .1345 .05 .1380 .04 .1361 .03 .1379 .04
Public 3 .0930 .02 .0967 .04 .0941 .04 .0945 .03 .0941 .04
Public 4 .0846 .02 .0929 .04 .0887 .04 .0866 .03 .0890 .04
0.6354 0.6367 0.6393 0.6266 0.6392
Private 1 .1224 .04 .1194 .04 .1200 .05 .1267 .04 .1198 .05
Private 2 .0912 .03 .0915 .03 .0922 .04 .0939 .03 .0921 .04
Private 3 .0768 .02 .0818 .04 .0753 .03 .0764 .02 .0756 .03
Private 4 .0743 .02 .0786 .04 .0740 .03 .0740 .02 .0751 .06
0.3647 0.3713 0.3615 0.3710 0.36266












Public 1 .3223 .13 .2700 .07 .3269 .08 .3742 .06 .2495 .05
Public 2 .1355 .03 .1456 .03 .1323 .03 .1202 .02 .1516 .03
Public 3 .0930 .02 .0991 .03 .0909 .03 .0822 .02 .1036 .03
Public 4 .0846 .02 .0923 .02 .0845 .02 .0767 .02 .0961 .02
PUBLIC 0.6354 0.607 0.6346 0.6533 0.6008
Private 1 .1224 .04 .1271 .04 .1217 .04 .1157 .04 .1297 .04
Private 2 .0912 .03 .0976 .03 .0895 .03 .0851 .03 .0973 .03
Private 3 .0768 .02 .0846 .02 .0773 .02 .0723 .02 .0864 .02
Private 4 .0743 .02 .0811 .01 .0743 .01 .0693 .01 .0832 .01
PRIVATE 0.3647 0.3904 0.3628 0.3424 0.3966














Public 1 .3223 .13 .2606 .05 .3858 .06 .2257 .04 .3331 .05
Public 2 .1355 .03 .1484 .03 .1180 .02 .1572 .03 .1280 .02
Public 3 .0930 .02 .1003 .03 .0810 .02 .1075 .03 .0867 .02
Public 4 .0846 .02 .0944 .03 .0757 .02 .1000 .02 .0816 .02
PUBLIC 0.6354 0.6037 0.6605 0.5904 0.6294
Private 1 .1224 .04 .1310 .04 .1134 .04 .1298 .04 .1238 .05
Private 2 .0912 .03 .0961 .03 .0836 .03 .1026 .03 .0905 .03
Private 3 .0768 .02 .0849 .02 .0706 .01 .0894 .02 .0784 .02
Private 4 .0743 .02 .0818 .01 .0678 .01 .0856 .01 .0747 .01
PRIVATE 0.3647 0.3938 0.3354 0.4074 0.36747
Figure 1. Allocating Work Hours: 
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